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THE IDENTITY OF EUROPEANS AFTER THE EU ENLARGEMENT
The enlargement of the European Union in 2004–2007 changed the borders of the 
polity, but also contributed to a crisis of the collective identity of Europeans. The 
inclusion of many new countries in the EU, relatively little known to the Western 
European public, generated questions concerning the common European framework 
of cultural heritage and way of life. Where are the borders of Europe, who is a Eu-
ropean, and who is “the signifi cant other” for the Europeans – that is, in relation to 
whom will Europeans construct their identity? These are the major questions occupy-
ing thoughts of scholars, intellectuals and public opinion in Europe and also are the 
main topic of our interest in this part of the volume.
Both “old” and “new” Europeans are experiencing an identity crisis. The citizens 
of the old 15 EU member states were confronted with enlargement without having 
been directly consulted, and without having had the chance to learn enough about 
the new members to accept them as “us” rather than “them” from behind the Iron 
Curtain. There is no clear concept of Eastern Europeans belonging to the community 
of Europeans, and frequent news in the media concerning the political behaviour of 
the Eastern Europeans or the lack of acceptance of crucial European values (such as 
tolerance, the secular state, the rule of law) has strengthened the feeling that the east 
of Europe is still divided from the west by a boundary of culture. The fear of competi-
tion in the labour market added to the feeling of anxiety and insecurity. Also, the fact 
that the enlargement was executed without democratic procedures, such as referenda, 
added to the popular impression that the European decision-making process is less 
than completely democratic.
Among the central questions determining the future of the EU after the enlarge-
ment is the one concerning the nature of European nations. How is national identity 
to be seen – as an ethnic entity, based on its cultural heritage, its traditional essence, 
and common ethnic origin, closed and exclusive, or as a political, civic construction, 
a future-oriented programme, open and inclusive. The discussion concerning national 
identity is among the most central in contemporary social science. The classic writ-
ings of Ernest Gellner (1983), Anthony D. Smith (1986), Eric Hobsbawm (1990), 
Benedict Anderson (1985) and others are followed by the concepts and ideas of such 
authors as Jürgen Habermas (1992, 2003), and Anthony Giddens (1991), who see 
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identity as a dynamic process of interactions, dialogue and negotiations, in which 
collective identities are constructed. Such a new approach gives a fresh meaning to 
the question of a supranational, European identity.
Initially, the concept of European identity was introduced to the European political 
agenda in the 1970s. It was designed during the Copenhagen EC summit in December 
1973 (European Commission, 1973) in the face of the ongoing global crisis. A few 
assumptions lay at the base of the concept. The European identity was supposed to be 
“based on the principle of the unity of the Nine, on their responsibility towards the rest 
of the world, and on the dynamic nature of the European construction” (Stråth 2002: 
388). With the consolidation and deepening of European integration, the concept be-
came even more important, despite various debates on its content, applicability and 
function (for more general discussion on the concept of collective identity see: Von 
Busekist 2004; Eder 2009; Brubaker and Cooper 2000). As Cathleen Kantner com-
ments “[w]ithout a ‘collective identity’ beyond the border of the national communities 
as common ground for common future projects, European effort to institutionalise 
common political solutions, procedures, and sometimes very expensive commitments 
might fail” (2006: 506). But what should a European identity consist of? 
Conventionally, European identity was based on shared and mobilising cultural 
commons defi ned through heritage and tradition stemming from “classical Greco-
Roman civilisation, Christianity and the ideas of the Enlightenment, Science, Rea-
son, Progress and Democracy” (Stråth 2002: 388). Crucial for defi nition of European 
identity was also the concept of the “signifi cant other” vis-à-vis whom the Europeans 
constructed their self-understanding. Scholars stress that historically, for construction 
of European identity three “mirrors” were of particular importance – the Oriental/
Asian, the American and the East European (Stråth 2002: 391, see also: Said 1979, 
Kumar 2008; Habermas and Derrida 2003). The last of the three is most interesting 
from the point of view of the focus of this volume. 
Establishment of Central and Eastern Europe as a concept of demarcation was 
part of the Enlightenment project. This region was not ascribed to “barbarians”, but 
was perceived as an ambiguous space, characterised by backwardness. “Construction 
of Eastern Europe was a paradox of simultaneous inclusion and exclusion: Europe, 
but at the same time, not Europe” (Stråth 2002: 393). The role of the signifi cant 
other, especially in relation to the European integration project, became particularly 
signifi cant during the Cold War. Before 1989, the Iron Curtain, a sinister symbol of 
division of Europe, was also a convenient instrument of classifi cation, a boundary 
which helped to construct and to express the collective identity of the integrating, 
western half of the continent. It was easy enough to think in terms of “who we are”, 
if on the other side of the Berlin Wall everything was different. Western Europe was 
democratic, free, prosperous, liberal, respecting human rights and market economy, 
while Eastern Europe was dictatorial, oppressed, and poor. It was clear who was “the 
signifi cant other”, the partner of identity construction, without whom the concept of 
Europeanness would have no meaning, or at least would lack clarity.
When the Iron Curtain disappeared, and the unifi cation process started, followed 
some years later by the formal accession of Central and Eastern Europe to the Eu-
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ropean Union, the important question of collective European identity was raised 
again. What would it now mean to be European? In relation to whom would the 
common European identity be constructed? Where would the new European bound-
ary be placed? What would be, if any, a common background of cultural symbols 
and values, on the basis of which the collective identity of the enlarged EU would be 
built? What is it that all the member states and their societies have in common, and 
how does this differ from the cultural, political and social identity of the European 
neighbours, the signifi cant others, in relation to whom the European identity is being 
constructed? The future of European integration largely depends on how these ques-
tions will be answered.
One of the important issues to discuss is the relations between the “old” and the 
“new” member states, broadly identifi ed with Western and Eastern (post-communist) 
Europe. Gerard Delanty in this volume deals with this question. He argues that the EU 
does not have a political or cultural identity in any meaningful sense, while the identity 
of nation-states has been undermined as a result of both Europeanisation and the wider 
process of globalisation. It is the case, Delanty argues, that it has been nation-states 
who have been the winners, in that with few, if any, exceptions most member states 
have benefi ted from EU membership and, as far as identity is concerned, national 
identity is far from being in demise. He further says that the current situation is more 
complicated and that one should recognise the modifi cation of nation-states by Euro-
peanisation. In his view one should not look for a European level of identity over and 
beyond national identities, but for the process of construction of a mixed or hybrid 
nature of national identities. Delanty’s main interest in the paper included in this vol-
ume is what he considers to be the changing relations of centres and peripheries. He 
believes that what used to be a European periphery (the east) is now emerging from 
marginalisation to become a site of cosmopolitan rebordering. The post-enlargement 
Europe is thus the post-Western Europe. He also mentions an important fact, that the 
societies of Central and Eastern Europe have put the brakes on the deepening of EU 
integration, although he claims that the consequences of this are not to stop further 
development of Europeanisation, but rather to develop it further within a different 
model of modernity. I do not quite agree with this argument. For the post-communist 
countries of Central and Eastern Europe and their societies, European integration has 
been from the beginning a process of modernisation, in which hopes, dreams and 
aspirations were invested. Central and Eastern Europeans wanted not just to get rid 
of communism and to become free, but they wished to follow the model of the West, 
in its political, cultural, and (perhaps most strongly) economic model. The dream was 
not just to be non-communist, but to become Western. So the process of accession to 
the EU was for them a modernising process, in which modernisation equalled West-
ernisation. Of course, the concept of the West was much idealised, with often naïve 
enthusiasm for what was seen as traditional Western values, little recognition of the 
existing internal differences within the Western world, and ignorance of confl icts be-
tween different Western states. An example of this may be the shock experienced by 
Eastern candidate countries when they supported the USA-led invasion of Iraq only 
to discover that many Western European states had no intention to do so and were 
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frustrated and angry when George W. Bush received unconditional support from East-
ern European soon-to-become EU member states. Nevertheless, the new members 
did not have any alternative model of modernisation to offer as an alternative to the 
Western one. They had little if anything to contribute, except a fresh enthusiasm for 
those Western values which in the West have in the meantime largely been forgotten, 
taken for granted, or criticised. They have no different vision of Europe and European 
integration. Once they became members of the EU, they concentrated on defending 
what they considered to be their national interests, mainly as far as the distribution 
of fi nancial support was concerned, sometimes trying to have their national dignity 
and pride satisfi ed. But in all this there has been little concern with Europe as a whole 
and no alternative model of European integration. Slowing down of the internal EU 
integration process was indeed, as Delanty claims, partly caused by the enlargement, 
yet not by the need to negotiate with new members which direction the integration 
would take, but rather by the situation in which it was necessary to struggle against 
resistance of one or another new member against proposed reforms leading to deeper 
integration. The position of Václav Klaus or the Kaczyński twins may be an example 
of this. They tried to stop the new European treaty not because they had an alternative 
one to propose, but because they were afraid that the treaties would undermine the tra-
ditionally understood sovereignty of their states. The Treaty Constitution for Europe 
was turned down by two old EU members, but one of the main reasons for the negative 
result of the referenda was the effect of the enlargement, the fear among citizens of 
“old Europe” that Europe after enlargement was less familiar, that the new Europeans 
were in fact strangers, with whom it was wiser not to integrate too closely, and that it 
was better not to delegate too much power to EU institutions, but to hide behind the 
familiar borders of the nation state. The diffi culties in integrating new member states 
into the EU result from their problems with implementation of EU rules, and perhaps 
from populism in some sectors of their societies, but not from an intention to develop 
in an alternative way. The old pattern of centre-periphery relations seems also to be 
confi rmed by the widespread labour migration from the East to the West, in which 
migrants take advantage of job opportunities, but do not contribute with an alternative 
way of life or values, rather trying to learn from the West. 
A diffi cult challenge for the new member states in their process of integration and 
building a new, European identity is to reconstruct their own, traditional identities 
in such a way that they are more compatible with processes developing in the “old” 
Europe. There are two important aspects of this issue, both represented in the papers 
included in this volume. One is the concept of pluralism, including the position of mi-
norities in national culture, civil society and democratic politics. Another is the prob-
lem of historical memory, and more particularly the great themes which dominate the 
European collective memory, but which may to a lesser extent have been represented 
in the national memories of the Eastern European states. Delanty argues that Eastern 
Europe has a long way to go in linking citizenship with diversity. It is very true that 
Eastern Europe is dominated by an ethnic concept of nation, in which minorities are 
seen as “others”, while their culture is excluded from the boundaries of the national 
culture. It is essential, especially in a highly mobile European society, to overcome 
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this legacy of the pre-communist and communist era and to replace an ethnic con-
cept of nation with a civic one, which accepts cultural diversity among citizens and 
which sees national integration mainly in terms of political culture, civic values and 
a common programme for the future. Such a forward-looking political understanding 
of national identity, rather than a past-looking ethnic concept, seems to be much bet-
ter adjusted to the present political and social reality of Europe. André Liebich also 
discusses differences between the Eastern and the Western European conceptions of 
the nation, and links them to the differences in experience with minorities, especially 
immigrants. Eastern Europeans are strongly attached to their traditional concept of 
unity of nation understood in cultural terms, and they fi nd it diffi cult to embrace such 
concepts as multilingualism or any elements of federalism. Although the opposition 
of East and West regarding the concept of nation seems here to be rather oversimpli-
fi ed, it remains true that new member states need to learn from their Western fellow 
EU members how to integrate their societies according to the principles of pluralism, 
internal diversity and openness. 
Georges Mink discusses the need to reconstruct collective memory in new Eu-
rope, especially in view of the need for reconciliation between countries which in 
the past experienced confl icts. Bitter memories divide neighbours, but there is also 
much resentment in Eastern Europe directed at Western European countries – not 
only former enemies, but also countries accused of betrayal of the East and of giving 
it over to Russia as the Soviet zone of infl uence. The Polish memory of Yalta is an 
example here. The question of historical memory is yet another example of asym-
metry in centre-periphery relations. The West is an important signifi cant other for 
the East, but the opposite is not true. The historical memory of the West has largely 
neglected, ignored and marginalised the East. In order to build a common Europe-
an identity this asymmetry ought to be overcome. For the moment Eastern member 
states do not seem likely to collectively forget their memories and to adopt those of 
the West. They have their own memories. On the other hand there is a need to include 
the East of Europe in some key themes of the historical European heritage, such as 
the responsibility for the Holocaust, and colonialism. Most Eastern countries do not 
feel responsible for colonialism, but if they are to be part of the common European 
heritage, they must accept also the dark side of it as their own legacy. To construct 
a common historical narrative might take a long time, but an effort in this direction 
seems to be an important condition of the success of European integration and of the 
construction of a common European identity. 
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